号码携带政策下通信行业有效监管研究——基于博弈论的视角

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2012, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (4): 58-64.

号码携带政策下通信行业有效监管研究——基于博弈论的视角

（重庆邮电大学经济管理学院，重庆400065）

出版日期:2012-08-30 发布日期:2023-03-27
基金资助:
工业和信息化部通信软科学项目（2010-R-16）

Regulation Research on Number Portability in the Telecommunication Industry#br# ——Based on Game Theory

(School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
Chongqing 400065, China)

Online:2012-08-30 Published:2023-03-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在通信行业实施双向转网的号码携带政策背景下，对移动通信运营商之间竞争产生的原因进行了分析；在竞争模式分析中，针对号码携带政策，在企业市场需求函数中加入了用户转网系数；最后分别建立用户与移动通信运营商、监管部门与移动通信运营商之间的博弈模型，分析得出监管部门在实施号码携带政策下，可通过加大处罚力度、降低企业采用恶性竞争手段的预期收益，以及降低企业提高自身服务水平的净支出等手段，实现有效监管。

关键词: 号码携带, 通信行业, 有效监管

Abstract:

Under the background of bidirectional number portability, a game model is built to analyze the cause of competition among telecom operators In the analysis of competitive mode, in view of the “number portability” policy, network switch coefficient is added in the demand function for the first time Then game model of users and mobile telecom operators and of supervision department and mobile telecom operators are built separately It is concluded that in the implementation of number portability policy, by increasing punishment, reducing the expected return brought by vicious competition and lowering the net expenditure of enterprises to improve their service level, supervision department can realize effective supervision

Key words: number portability, telecommunication industry, effective supervision

中图分类号:

F602

刘跃, 周亮. 号码携带政策下通信行业有效监管研究——基于博弈论的视角[J]. 北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版), 2012, 14(4): 58-64.

LIU Yue, ZHOU Liang. Regulation Research on Number Portability in the Telecommunication Industry#br# ——Based on Game Theory [J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition), 2012, 14(4): 58-64.