北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2013, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (5): 45-50.

• 电子商务 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于信号博弈的网络购物信息不对称研究

  

  1. 1 北京邮电大学 经济管理学院,北京100876;2 北京语言大学 对外汉语研究中心,北京100083
  • 收稿日期:2013-07-03 出版日期:2013-10-30 发布日期:2023-03-27
  • 基金资助:

    国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2012CB315805);国家自然科学基金项目 (71172135,71231002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2013RC0603)

Information Asymmetry of Online Shopping Based on Signaling Game Model

  1. 1 School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China; 2 Centre for Studies of Chinese as a Second Language, Beijing Language ane Culture University, Beijing 100083, China
  • Received:2013-07-03 Online:2013-10-30 Published:2023-03-27

摘要:

网络购物作为当今的主流消费形式之一,因其信息的不对称性,给交易双方带来了很大障碍,极大地降低了网络交易市场的效率。为了解决网络购物市场低效率的问题,本文利用博弈论方法,建立了网络购物买卖双方的信号博弈模型,针对商家采取的不同策略求解,最终提出了在信息不对称的网络购物市场下,保护消费者权益的各项措施和建议。

关键词: 网络购物, 信号博弈, 信息不对称, 伪装成本

Abstract:

Nowadays, online shopping has become one of the mainstream form of consumption However, information asymmetry brings a big obstacle to the transaction parties, which leads to inefficiencies of online trading market In order to solve the inefficient market, a signaling game model of buyers and sellers of online shopping is established through game theory method Aiming at quantitatively analyzing the different strategies taken by merchants,the consumer protection measures and recommendations are provided

Key words: online shopping, signaling game, information asymmetry, pretend cost

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