北京邮电大学学报(社科版) ›› 2016, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 58-64.

• 经济与哲学 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于经济博弈模型的酒类防伪问题研究

  

  1. 北京邮电大学 经济管理学院,北京100876
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-27 出版日期:2016-06-30
  • 基金资助:

    国家科技支撑计划项目(2014BAH23F07)

Wine Anti-counterfeiting Issues Based on Economic Game Theory Model

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
    Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2016-03-27 Online:2016-06-30

摘要:

面对酒类行业制假问题的频发,品牌酒厂需要从经济本质探寻有效防伪的方法。采用混合策略博弈和不完全信息动态博弈的方法研究品牌酒厂、制假者和消费者之间的经济利益关系,解释了采取规模化防伪措施的必要性,提出防伪程度的界定标准,认为采取防伪行动利于减少信息的不对称。并进一步估算出在保证品牌酒厂收益最大的前提下,防伪投入成本的最优值,为品牌酒厂提供合理的方向指导,为监管部门提供政策建议。

关键词: 酒类防伪, 规模化防伪, 防伪程度, 最优成本投入, 博弈论

Abstract:

In the face of the problems of frequent fraud in wine industry, brand wineries have taken anti-counterfeiting measures to cope with the economic and brand loss caused by adulterated wine The economic relationships among the brand wineries, counterfeiters and consumers are analyzed in mixed strategy game and incomplete information dynamic game theory to explain the necessity of taking anti-counterfeiting operations and to propose the defined standards of anti-counterfeiting level What’s more, the related factors affecting consumer purchase are clarified, which is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry Then, in the premise of ensuring the maximum earnings of the brand wineries, the optimal value of the anti-counterfeiting investment cost is estimated so as to provide reasonable guidance for brand wineries and policy recommendations for regulatory authorities to promote the establishment of a sound regulatory system and a whole virtuous circle for the wine market

Key words:  wine anti-counterfeiting, scale security, security degree, optimal cost, game theory

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