北京邮电大学学报(社科版) ›› 2017, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (4): 72-79.

• 经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于委托代理理论的打假模型

  

  1. 北京邮电大学 经济管理学院,北京100876
  • 收稿日期:2017-03-31 出版日期:2017-08-30

Regulatory Model for Fake Products Based on Principal-agent Theory

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
    Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2017-03-31 Online:2017-08-30

摘要:  市场经济发展过程中各方信息不对称导致大量假冒伪劣产品的出现,不仅扰乱市场秩序,而且严重影响人民生活。本文在信息不对称条件下建立一个委托代理模型,研究了假冒伪劣产品从厂商流向销售商,再从销售商流向消费者的监管问题。结合激励机制和惩罚机制,给出一定假设前提下的最优合约设计,防止假冒伪劣产品进一步流入市场,以期为政府工商部门及电商平台的打假工作提供参考。

关键词: 委托代理模型, 信息不对称, 打假, 合同设计

Abstract: The asymmetry of information in the development of market economy has led to a large number of fake and shoddy products, which disturb market order and seriously affect people′s life The principal-agent model under asymmetric information is established, and the regulatory policies for fake products are studied in the process related to factories, retailers and customers Combining with incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism, the optimal contract design under some certain premises is proposed, which can prevent the fake and shoddy products entering into the market Results can provide reference for regulatory policies on fake disposal management

Key words:  principal-agent model, information asymmetry, anti-counterfeit, contract design

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