北京邮电大学学报(社科版) ›› 2018, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (1): 76-85.

• 经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

中国邮政与物流企业在农村物流合作中的委托代理分析

  

  1. 北京工商大学 商学院,北京100048
  • 收稿日期:2017-11-20 出版日期:2018-02-28
  • 基金资助:
    国家科技支撑计划(2015BAD18B01);北京市社会科学基金项目(15JGB093);北京工商大学2017年研究生科研能力提升计划项目

Cooperation Between China Post and Logistics Enterprises in #br# Rural Logistics Based on Principal-agent Theory #br#

  1. Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China
  • Received:2017-11-20 Online:2018-02-28

摘要: 农村物流的发展是推动“工业品下乡”和“农产品进城”的重要引擎。中国邮政的优势在于网点广,民间物流企业的优势在于业务多,政府如何推动双方合作及双方如何合作是推动农村物流发展的焦点。运用委托代理理论的多委托人—单代理人模型,构建物流企业作为委托方、中国邮政作为代理方的激励模型,分析在多方参与的情形下,不同物流企业之间是否需要合作、邮政最优行动选择问题及影响双方收益的关键因素,同时研究政府是否补贴以及补贴对象对合作效应的影响,以为实践提供参考。

关键词: 农村物流, 政府补贴, 委托代理, 激励机制

Abstract: The development of rural logistics is an important engine to promote the ′industrial products to the countryside′ and ′agricultural products to the city′ The advantage of China Post is its numerous outlets, and the advantage of private logistics enterprises lies in lots of orders. As a result, how the government promotes cooperation between the two sides and their cooperative approaches are the focus of rural logistics development The incentive model is constructed in which logistics enterprises are the entrusting party and China Post is the agent party through using principal-agent theory, and under the condition of multi-participants, whether different logistics enterprises need to cooperate with each other, China Post′s optimal strategy and the key factors that affect earnings of every parties are analyzed At the same time, impact of government subsidy strategy on cooperation is explored

Key words:  rural logistics, government subsidy, principal-agent theory, incentive mechanism

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