北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2021, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (1): 28-40.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2020.0122

• 电子商务 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈的电子商务生态系统协同机制研究

危小超(1986—),男,河南郑州人,副教授,博士生导师   

  1. 武汉理工大学  经济学院,湖北  武汉430070
  • 收稿日期:2020-05-19 出版日期:2021-02-28 发布日期:2021-03-07
  • 通讯作者: 危小超(1986—),男,河南郑州人,副教授,博士生导师
  • 作者简介:危小超(1986—),男,河南郑州人,副教授,博士生导师
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71601151);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(16YJC630131)

Coordinated Mechanism of E-commerce Ecosystem Based on Evolutionary Game

  1. School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
  • Received:2020-05-19 Online:2021-02-28 Published:2021-03-07

摘要: 当前,电子商务企业竞争日益激烈,已经上升到生态系统层面,有必要研究电子商务生态系统的演化均衡机制。鉴于此,分析电子商务生态系统中的三个主要种群——领导种群、关键种群和支持种群,考虑成本分摊和收益共享,建立三方演化博弈模型,并用仿真实验研究电子商务生态系统稳定演化机制。结果表明:(1)三方参与主体受彼此参与意愿影响程度各异,关键种群影响力度大于支持种群,领导种群影响最小。(2)领导种群激励政策的作用受关键种群和支持种群的初始意愿影响:当初始意愿较低时,激励政策可以提高合作水平;当初始意愿较高时,激励政策可以促进生态系统快速达到稳定状态(提高收敛速度)。(3)合理的收益共享系数有利于提升关键种群和支持种群的合作水平。所提出的模型旨在为电子商务生态系统演化动态量化研究提供有益的借鉴。


关键词: 电子商务, 生态系统, 演化博弈, 稳定, 演化

Abstract:  At present, the competition among e-commerce enterprises is increasingly fierce, which has risen to the level of the ecosystem. It is necessary to study the evolutionary equilibrium mechanism of the e-commerce ecosystem. Based on the perspective of evolutionary game, the three main populations in the e-commerce ecosystem-the leading population, the key population and the supporting population are studied, and under the assumption of spreading the cost and sharing the revenue, a three-party evolutionary game model is established, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the e-commerce ecosystem are explored. The results show that 1) the three parties have different degrees of influence on each others willingness to participate. The influence of the key population is stronger than that of the supporting population, and the influence of the leading population is the least. 2) The incentive policy of the leading population is influenced by the initial willingness of the key population and the supporting population. When the initial willingness is low, the incentive policy can improve the cooperative level; when the initial willingness is high, the incentive policy can promote the ecosystem to reach the stable state quickly (improve the rate of convergence). 3) Reasonable revenue sharing coefficient is conducive to improving the cooperative level of the key and the supporting populations. The model provides a useful attempt for quantitative research on the evolution dynamics of e-commerce ecosystem.


Key words:  , e-commerce, ecosystem, evolutionary game, stability, evolution

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