知识场视角下创新联盟稳定性影响因素研究

doi:10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2021.0006

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2021, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (3): 45-54.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2021.0006

知识场视角下创新联盟稳定性影响因素研究

1.北京邮电大学经济管理学院，北京100876；2.北京邮电大学现代邮政学院，北京100876

出版日期:2021-06-30 发布日期:2021-07-05
作者简介:魏国宏(1983—)，女，山东聊城人，在读博士

Influencing Factors of Innovation Alliance Stability from Perspective of Knowledge Field

1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876,
China;2. School of Modern Post, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China

Online:2021-06-30 Published:2021-07-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 从知识场视角探讨导致联盟企业选择离合创新策略的影响因素；运用演化博弈理论构建联盟企业协同创新与离合创新模式的演化复制动态方程，分析其创新行为演化均衡点的稳定性及演化规律；对影响战略联盟稳定性的企业离合倾向与离合收益，以及协同收益分配系数等进行比较静态分析。研究结果表明:企业的离合倾向、协同收益分配系数、协同收益以及采用协同创新策略与离合创新策略的初始比例等都会对联盟稳定性产生影响，据此提出联盟管控与政策建议。

关键词: 创新战略联盟, 演化博弈, 协同创新, 离合创新, 知识场

Abstract: The influencing factors that lead to the choice of “deviated” innovation strategies of alliance enterprises are discussed from the perspective of knowledge field. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, the dynamic equation of evolution and replication with alliance enterprises collaborative innovation and “deviated” innovation is constructed, and the stability and evolution law of the equilibrium point of innovation behavior evolution are analyzed. And a comparative static analysis is made about “deviated” tendency and “deviated” revenue that affect the stability of strategic alliance, and the collaborative revenue distribution coefficient. The results show that “deviated” tendency, the collaborative revenue distribution coefficient, the collaborative revenue and the initial proportion of the two strategies will all affect the stability of alliance. Based on this, suggestions about alliance supervision and policies are made.

Key words: innovation strategic alliance, evolution game, collaborative innovation, “deviated” innovation, knowledge field

中图分类号:

C931
G203

魏国宏, 闫强. 知识场视角下创新联盟稳定性影响因素研究[J]. 北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版), 2021, 23(3): 45-54.

WEI Guohong, YAN Qiang. Influencing Factors of Innovation Alliance Stability from Perspective of Knowledge Field[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition), 2021, 23(3): 45-54.

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知识场视角下创新联盟稳定性影响因素研究

Influencing Factors of Innovation Alliance Stability from Perspective of Knowledge Field

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