Abstract:  Taking Chinas A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2017 as research samples, the relationship between executive turnover and the risk of stock price crash is empirically tested. The results show that without distinguishing the turnover type, the executive turnover will reduce the risk of stock price crash, but after distinguishing the turnover type, the normal executive turnover will reduce the risk of stock price crash while the forced turnover will increase the risk of stock price crash. Furthermore, due to the different ways and purposes of executive appointment in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the samples are divided into the state-owned enterprise group and the private enterprise group and tested respectively. It is found that private enterprises are still in line with the above conclusions, while the relationship between forced turnover in state-owned enterprises and the risk of stock price crash is not significant. The meaning of listed companies executive turnover is explained to provide investors a new perspective of analysis. This has practical significance to understanding the meaning of executive turnover and reducing the risk of stock price crash.

Key words: executive turnover, the risk of stock price crash, state-owned enterprise, principal-agent mechanism