Abstract:  Taking A-share listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2020 as samples, the impact of policy burden on the innovation performance of SOEs, the differences of the impact under different levels and functions of SOEs, and the moderating effect of executive incentives are explored. The results show that: (1) The policy burden has a significantly negative impact on the innovation performance of SOEs; (2) Compared with SOEs directly under the central government, the policy burden has a greater negative impact on the innovation performance of local SOEs; (3) Compared with commercial SOEs, the policy burden has a greater negative impact on the innovation performance of public welfare SOEs; (4) Executive incentives moderate the negative effects of the policy burden and innovation performance of SOEs, and stock ownership incentives and promotion incentives mitigate the negative effects (stock ownership incentives are more obvious), while compensation incentives aggravate the negative effects.

Key words:  state-owned enterprises, policy burden, innovation performance, executive incentives