Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters)

• 管理科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

关于国有企业经营者选拔、激励与约束机制的探讨

靳 娟   

  1. 北京邮电大学文法经济学院

  • 收稿日期:2002-04-28 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2002-07-20

Astudyoftheselective,incentiveandrestrictivemechanismoftheexecutivesofstateenterprises

JIN Juan   

  1. School of Humanities, Law and Economics, BUPT
  • Received:2002-04-28 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2002-07-20

摘要:

在我国国有企业建立现代企业制度的过程中,委托代理问题日益突出,并由此影响了经济体制改革的深化。因此,探讨如何在国有企业建立有效的经营者选拔、激励和约束机制,以避免逆向选择和道德风险,已成为当代企业理论研究的核心问题。本文分析了国有企业经营者选拔、激励与约束机制的现状,提出了建立有效的国企经营者选拔、激励与约束机制的途径。

关键词: 经营者, 代理关系, 选拔机制, 激励机制, 约束机制

Abstract: In the course of establishing modern enterprise system in state enterprises, the problem of trusting and acting has become more and more prominent, which is influencing the deepening of economic reform. So the study of the establishment of effective, incentive and restrictive mechanism has become one of the theoretical cores of modern enterprises. This essay analyzes the present situation of the selective, incentive and restrictive mechanism of the executives of state enterprises and proposes some effective ways to solve this problem.

Key words: executive, actrelation, selectivemechanism, incentivemechanism, restrictivemechanism

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