Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters)

• 信息经济 • 上一篇    下一篇

隐性知识共享的进化博弈分析

韩璐,金永生

  

  1. 北京邮电大学 经济管理学院,北京100876

  • 收稿日期:1900-01-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-12-31

Analysisofrecessiveknowledgesharingbyevolutionarygamestheory

HAN Lu,JIN Yong-sheng   

  1. School of Economics and Management, BUPT, Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:1900-01-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-12-31

摘要: 对于企业来说隐性知识比显性知识更有价值,但是隐性知识的共享却一直是知识管理中的难点。结合进化博弈理论,通过研究参与者在知识共享过程中的态度和利益的变化,设计了一种进化博弈模型,找出了隐性知识难以共享的原因和知识分享的发展路径,期望帮助企业通过共享隐性知识来提高企业的效率、推动企业创新,形成良好的企业“共享文化”。

关键词: 隐性知识, 知识共享, 进化博弈, 知识管理

Abstract:

For a company, recessive knowledge is much more valuable than visible knowledge, whereas it is difficult to make recessive knowledge shared in knowledge management. Based on the evolutionary games theory, the changes of the participators’ attitude and their benefits are researched in knowledge sharing processes, and then an evolutionary games model is proposed. With this model, the reason why recessive knowledge is hard to be shared and the path of knowledge sharing is found. If taking advantage of recessive knowledge, companies would improve their efficiency, innovation, and competition ability. As a result, a good “sharing culture” will emerge.

Key words: recessiveknowledge, knowledgesharing, evolutionarygamestheory, knowledgemanagement

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