上市公司高管薪酬与企业分红相关性实证研究

Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters)

上市公司高管薪酬与企业分红相关性实证研究

周慧琴，肖姗姗

北京邮电大学经济管理学院

收稿日期:2008-12-25 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2009-02-28

Anempiricalstudyonthecorrelationbetweenexecutivepayandcorporatedividendsinlistedcompanies

ZHOU Hui-qin， XIAO Shan-shan

School of Economics and Management, BUPT

Received:2008-12-25 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2009-02-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过实证研究的方法，以委托代理理论为依据，分析了高管薪酬与企业分红间的相关关系，并进一步阐述了影响两者相关关系的因素，试图通过一个新的视角来看待委托代理问题。最后得出高管薪酬与企业分红呈阶段性的相关关系，企业利润、现金流和企业规模是影响两者相关关系稳定因素的结论，为公司中股东与经营者之间的委托代理问题的解决提供了对策和意见，为公司治理结构的改善提供了参考。

关键词: 委托代理理论, 高管薪酬, 企业分红, 监督和激励

Abstract: Executive pay and corporate dividends policy are topics that attract considerable public concern. They are also hotspots of theoretical research. This article analyzes the correlation between executive pay and corporate dividends, and then analyzes the factors that have impact on the relationship of executive pay and corporate dividend based on the principal-agent theory and by empirical research method. The conclusion is that executive pay and corporate dividend show staging correlation and profits, cash flows and the size of the company have a stable influence on the relationship of the two. This article attempts to adopt a new perspective to the principal-agent problem and provides a solution to improve corporate governance structure.

Key words: principal-agenttheory, executivepay, corporatedividends, supervisionandencouragement

中图分类号:

周慧琴，肖姗姗. 上市公司高管薪酬与企业分红相关性实证研究[J]. Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters).

ZHOU Hui-qin， XIAO Shan-shan. Anempiricalstudyonthecorrelationbetweenexecutivepayandcorporatedividendsinlistedcompanies[J]. Acta Metallurgica Sinica(English letters).