Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2013, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (5): 45-50.

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Information Asymmetry of Online Shopping Based on Signaling Game Model

  

  1. 1 School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China; 2 Centre for Studies of Chinese as a Second Language, Beijing Language ane Culture University, Beijing 100083, China
  • Received:2013-07-03 Online:2013-10-30 Published:2023-03-27

Abstract:

Nowadays, online shopping has become one of the mainstream form of consumption However, information asymmetry brings a big obstacle to the transaction parties, which leads to inefficiencies of online trading market In order to solve the inefficient market, a signaling game model of buyers and sellers of online shopping is established through game theory method Aiming at quantitatively analyzing the different strategies taken by merchants,the consumer protection measures and recommendations are provided

Key words: online shopping, signaling game, information asymmetry, pretend cost

CLC Number: