JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM ›› 2020, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (1): 20-29.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2019.0197

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Incentive Mechanism Design for B2B Platform under Dual Reputation


  1. School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
  • Received:2019-05-16 Online:2020-02-28

Abstract: The market reputation cannot achieve long-term incentives for the B2B platform In order to suppress the long-term moral hazard of the B2B platform, a two-stage principal-agent model that introduces market reputation and internal reputation is constructed. The inverse induction method is used to solve the incentive effect of the dual reputation under the two-phase cooperation, and the impact of internal reputation on the incentive contract is also compared and analyzed It is found that market reputation can only suppress the short-term moral hazard of B2B platform, while internal reputation can inhibit the short-term and long-term moral hazard of B2B platform, but its short-term incentive effect is worse than that of market reputation; the incentive mechanism under dual reputation can solve the problem that market reputation cannot realize the long-term incentives and can make up for the shortcomings of short-term incentives for internal reputation Therefore, the incentive mechanism based on dual reputation is more reasonable and effective for banks

Key words: dual reputation, seller electronic order, principal-agent, incentive mechanism

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