Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM ›› 2016, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 58-64.

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Wine Anti-counterfeiting Issues Based on Economic Game Theory Model

  

  1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
    Beijing 100876, China
  • Received:2016-03-27 Online:2016-06-30

Abstract:

In the face of the problems of frequent fraud in wine industry, brand wineries have taken anti-counterfeiting measures to cope with the economic and brand loss caused by adulterated wine The economic relationships among the brand wineries, counterfeiters and consumers are analyzed in mixed strategy game and incomplete information dynamic game theory to explain the necessity of taking anti-counterfeiting operations and to propose the defined standards of anti-counterfeiting level What’s more, the related factors affecting consumer purchase are clarified, which is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry Then, in the premise of ensuring the maximum earnings of the brand wineries, the optimal value of the anti-counterfeiting investment cost is estimated so as to provide reasonable guidance for brand wineries and policy recommendations for regulatory authorities to promote the establishment of a sound regulatory system and a whole virtuous circle for the wine market

Key words:  wine anti-counterfeiting, scale security, security degree, optimal cost, game theory

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