北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (4): 12-25.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2021.0202

• 经济与管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

供应链金融参与者机会主义行为演化研究

石岿然(1971—),男,湖南湘潭人,博士,教授   

  1. 南京审计大学 金融学院,江苏 南京211815
  • 收稿日期:2021-10-25 出版日期:2022-08-31 发布日期:2022-08-31
  • 作者简介:石岿然(1971—),男,湖南湘潭人,博士,教授

Evolution of Supply Chain Finance Participants’ Opportunistic Behaviors

  1. School of Finance, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China
  • Received:2021-10-25 Online:2022-08-31 Published:2022-08-31

摘要: 供应链金融参与者机会主义行为导致供应链金融风险事件频发,阻碍了供应链金融功能发挥作用。对机会主义行为的治理成为供应链金融这一模式持续发展的关键。基于前景理论刻画参与者的感知收益,运用演化博弈方法分析供应链金融参与者的机会主义行为,构建金融机构和融资企业的演化博弈模型,分析二者的演化路径和不同条件下的演化稳定策略。研究发现:演化博弈存在四种演化稳定状态,当积极监管收益过低、监管成本过高、监管效率过低或风险损失责任成本过低时,金融机构的机会主义倾向会很高;当违约收益过高、违约惩罚过低或守约收益过低时,融资企业的机会主义倾向会很高。根据研究结果从金融机构和供应链企业两个层面提出了供应链金融参与者机会主义行为防范对策。

关键词: 供应链金融, 机会主义行为, 演化博弈, 演化稳定策略

Abstract: Supply Chain Finance (SCF) risk incidents caused by participants’ opportunistic behaviors occur frequently, hindering the functioning of SCF The governance for opportunistic behaviors is the key to the sustainable development of SCF Prospect theory is used to describe the subjective utility of participants, and evolutionary game methods are applied to analyze SCF participants’ opportunistic behaviors An evolutionary game model between financial institutions and financing firms is presented to find the evolutionary path of each participant and the evolutionary stability strategies under different conditions The result shows that there are four evolutionary stable states in the evolutionary game model When the benefits of active supervision are too low, the cost of supervision is too high, the efficiency of supervision is too low, or the cost of liability for risk loss is too low, the tendency of financial institutions to be opportunistic will be high; when the default benefits are too high, the penalty for default is too low, or the return on compliance is too low, the opportunistic tendency of financing firms will be high In response to the analysis results, countermeasures are proposed to prevent opportunistic behaviors of SCF participants at financial institutions level and supply chain enterprises level

Key words: supply chain finance, opportunistic behaviors, evolutionary game, evolutionary stability strategy

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