创新生态系统治理研究——基于三方演化博弈的视角

doi:10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2021.0204

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版) ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (2): 68-78.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2021.0204

创新生态系统治理研究——基于三方演化博弈的视角

危小超(1986—)，男，河南郑州人，副教授，博士生导师

武汉理工大学经济学院

收稿日期:2021-10-26 出版日期:2022-04-30 发布日期:2022-05-05
作者简介:危小超(1986—)，男，河南郑州人，副教授，博士生导师
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71601151)；教育部人文社会科学基金项目(16YJC630131)

Innovative Ecosystem Governance——From Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology

Received:2021-10-26 Online:2022-04-30 Published:2022-05-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 创新生态系统能否有效运行取决于治理机制能否保证合作各方高效协作。基于契约治理和关系治理，构建平台企业领导、互补企业参与的三方演化博弈模型，分析博弈主体行为稳定性的条件，并结合数值模拟讨论关键因素影响。研究表明：互补企业获得的最小超额收益决定其策略选择，任何一方研发投入的变化都会改变参与主体所能接受的最小超额收益。激励机制是互补企业参与创新合作网络的必要前提。平台企业拥有较强的网络关系将明显提高互补企业的合作意愿，处于弱关系的两方能够通过与双方均为强关系的第三方建立联结，从而达成合作。

关键词: 创新生态系统, 治理机制, 三方博弈, 演化博弈

Abstract: The effective operation of the innovation ecosystem depends on the efficient collaboration of all partners in the governance mechanism. Based on contract governance and relationship governance, a tripartite evolutionary game model including platform enterprises and complementary enterprises is constructed. The conditions of the behavior stability of the game subjects are analyzed, and the key influencing factors are discussed by numerical simulation. The results show that the minimum excess returns obtained by complementary enterprises determine their strategic choice, and the change of R&D investment of either side will change the minimum excess returns accepted by participants. Incentive mechanism is a necessary prerequisite for complementary enterprises to participate in the innovation cooperation network. Platform enterprises with strong network relationships will significantly improve the cooperation willingness of complementary enterprises, and the two parties in a weak relationship can reach cooperation by a third party which has strong relationship with both.

Key words: innovation ecosystem, governance mechanism, tripartite game, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

危小超, 潘港美. 创新生态系统治理研究——基于三方演化博弈的视角[J]. 北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版), 2022, 24(2): 68-78.

WEI Xiaochao, PAN Gangmei. Innovative Ecosystem Governance——From Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 24(2): 68-78.

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创新生态系统治理研究——基于三方演化博弈的视角

Innovative Ecosystem Governance——From Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

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