Abstract: In recent years, the concept of sharing and cooperation has gradually integrated into the express delivery industry. However, the utilization rate of co-distribution mode in express industry is not high, and there are problems such as small cooperation scope, ambiguous pricing mechanism, and unreasonable revenue distribution. Based on the background of joint distribution and considering the influence of couriers’ behavior on the revenue of express delivery companies, a 4-level Stackelberg pricing game model is constructed for express companies, co-distribution centers, contract areas, couriers and express cabinets (posting stations) the best pricing strategy is formulated based on reverse derivation, and the effectiveness of the model is analyzed in combination with actual data. The study shows that joint distribution can effectively reduce the delivery cost of express companies and improve their efficiency; a reasonable pricing mechanism can provide stable income for all parties involved and maintain the development of the alliance; in addition, couriers’ behavior is an important factor affecting the pricing of the alliance.

Key words: joint distribution, pricing model, Stackelberg game, couriers’ behavior