CEO Excess Compensation and Enterprise Innovation

doi:10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2022.0041

Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition) ›› 2022, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (5): 39-57.doi: 10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2022.0041

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CEO Excess Compensation and Enterprise Innovation

School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Online:2022-10-30 Published:2022-11-16

Abstract

Abstract: The data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2018 is selected as the sample, and the influencing effect, the influencing factors, the influencing mechanism and the economic consequence of CEO excess compensation on enterprise innovation are analyzed and verified. The research results show that in terms of the influencing effect, the more CEO excess compensation, the higher the level of enterprise innovation. In terms of the influencing factors, when the higher the level of CEO holdings and the weaker the degree of supervision by the board of directors, the stronger the role of CEO excess compensation in promoting the level of enterprise innovation, and at the same time, compared with state-owned enterprises, CEO excess compensation of non-state-owned enterprises has a more significant effect on promoting the level of enterprise innovation. In terms of the influencing mechanism, CEO excess compensation can improve the level of enterprise innovation mainly by alleviating the financing constraints of enterprises and improving the risk preference of CEOs. In terms of the economic consequence, CEO excess compensation can improve enterprise performance by promoting enterprise innovation activities. The research has enriched the relevant literature on the influencing factors of enterprise innovation and the economic consequence of CEO excess compensation, provides new ideas for corporate governance mechanism and also provides reference for compensation policy makers.

Key words: CEO excess compensation, enterprise innovation, financing constraints, risk preference

CLC Number:

F275.5

HE Ying, FANG Zijie. CEO Excess Compensation and Enterprise Innovation[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition), 2022, 24(5): 39-57.

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CEO Excess Compensation and Enterprise Innovation

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