Abstract:  At present, the competition among e-commerce enterprises is increasingly fierce, which has risen to the level of the ecosystem. It is necessary to study the evolutionary equilibrium mechanism of the e-commerce ecosystem. Based on the perspective of evolutionary game, the three main populations in the e-commerce ecosystem-the leading population, the key population and the supporting population are studied, and under the assumption of spreading the cost and sharing the revenue, a three-party evolutionary game model is established, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the e-commerce ecosystem are explored. The results show that 1) the three parties have different degrees of influence on each others willingness to participate. The influence of the key population is stronger than that of the supporting population, and the influence of the leading population is the least. 2) The incentive policy of the leading population is influenced by the initial willingness of the key population and the supporting population. When the initial willingness is low, the incentive policy can improve the cooperative level; when the initial willingness is high, the incentive policy can promote the ecosystem to reach the stable state quickly (improve the rate of convergence). 3) Reasonable revenue sharing coefficient is conducive to improving the cooperative level of the key and the supporting populations. The model provides a useful attempt for quantitative research on the evolution dynamics of e-commerce ecosystem.

Key words:  , e-commerce, ecosystem, evolutionary game, stability, evolution