北京邮电大学学报(社科版) ›› 2016, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (4): 26-34.

• 电子商务 • 上一篇    下一篇

结伪互联网金融能否终结——以P2P网贷为例

  

  1. 上海理工大学 管理学院,上海200093
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-30 出版日期:2016-08-31
  • 基金资助:

    沪江基金研究基地专项基金资助项目(D14008)

Whether the Illegal Internet Finance Can be Ended#br# ——A Case Study of P2P Online Lending Platforms

  1. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
  • Received:2016-03-30 Online:2016-08-31

摘要:

运用不完全信息下的动态博弈模型,研究了P2P网贷平台之间以及P2P网贷平台与监管机构之间的行为选择。发现若在政府不会主动监管的情形下,整个行业会因违规操作平台的存在,迫使合规经营的平台倾向于违规经营;若在政府采取严格监管的情形下,监管机构的监管成本与行业中违规经营平台的数量呈正相关关系;监管机构的收益、上级行政机构对监管机构的处罚力度与行业中违规经营平台的数量呈负相关关系。其次,运用成本收益法进行分析,发现引入行业自律委员会能够帮助监管机构缓解监管压力,使得行业中违规经营平台的数量进一步降低。

关键词:  , P2P网贷平台, 监管机构, 动态博弈, 成本收益法

Abstract:

he dynamic game model with incomplete information is employed to study the choice of behavior among P2P online lending platforms and between P2P online lending platforms and regulators If regulators do not supervise these platforms initiatively, the legal platforms will be pushed to operate illegally because of the existence of illegal platforms Meanwhile, if regulators supervise them strictly, the costs of regulators and the number of illegal platforms show a positive correlation relationship, and the benefits of regulators and the number of illegal platforms show a negative correlation, and it also shows a negative correlation between the intensity of punishment from supervising authorities and the number of illegal platforms Then, the cost-benefit approach is used to demonstrate that the industry self-discipline committee can help regulators to ease regulatory pressure, and thus, the number of illegal platforms can be further reduced

Key words:  P2P online lending platforms, regulators, dynamic game theory, cost-benefit approach

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