Abstract: Supply Chain Finance (SCF) risk incidents caused by participants’ opportunistic behaviors occur frequently, hindering the functioning of SCF The governance for opportunistic behaviors is the key to the sustainable development of SCF Prospect theory is used to describe the subjective utility of participants, and evolutionary game methods are applied to analyze SCF participants’ opportunistic behaviors An evolutionary game model between financial institutions and financing firms is presented to find the evolutionary path of each participant and the evolutionary stability strategies under different conditions The result shows that there are four evolutionary stable states in the evolutionary game model When the benefits of active supervision are too low, the cost of supervision is too high, the efficiency of supervision is too low, or the cost of liability for risk loss is too low, the tendency of financial institutions to be opportunistic will be high; when the default benefits are too high, the penalty for default is too low, or the return on compliance is too low, the opportunistic tendency of financing firms will be high In response to the analysis results, countermeasures are proposed to prevent opportunistic behaviors of SCF participants at financial institutions level and supply chain enterprises level

Key words: supply chain finance, opportunistic behaviors, evolutionary game, evolutionary stability strategy