Abstract: In order to deal with traffic safety problems caused by traffic violation of instant logistics riders, replacing expected utility theory with prospect theory, an evolutionary game model of regulation of riders’ non-compliant delivery was constructed, which integrated subjective probability weight function with value function. The interactive relationship and influencing factors between instant logistics platform regulation and riders’ delivery decision-making were analyzed. The decision model of riders’ selection of delivery strategies related to income was further established by introducing reputation incentive mechanism, and a new approach to the regulation of non-compliant delivery behavior of riders with different risk attitudes was explored. The results show that the proportion of riders’ compliant delivery is positively correlated with the probability of investigating irregular delivery and fines, the probability of traffic accidents and corresponding losses, and negatively correlated with the cost of riders’ compliant delivery. Platform and riders’ risk preference attributes of high probability loss and underestimation of the prospect value perception of active regulation cost and compliant delivery cost make it difficult to form an ideal equilibrium stability strategy. Riders with different risk attitudes have different feedback on reputation incentive mechanism of platform. By introducing reputation incentive mechanism, the platform can promote risk-aversion riders to choose compliant delivery strategies. However, the mechanism fails to riders with risk preference, and the platform should restrict risk preference riders to choose irregular delivery strategies by setting reasonable penalties. The research results can provide a theoretical reference for the instant logistics platform to formulate a regulatory strategy combining rewards and punishments.

Key words: riders’ traffic violation, instant logistics platform, reputation incentive, prospect theory, evolutionary game